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Most theorists believe that there are mental states ” such as occurrent thoughts or judgments ” that are access-conscious (in whatever is the correct functionally-definable sense), but that are not phenomenally conscious.
But sense (4), that of "what it is like" to entertain a given quale, can be generalized: It is not only qualia that have the higher-order what-it's-like property; arguably propositional attitudes and other states that do not involve qualia in sense (3), such as occurrent thoughts, have it too (Siewert
Apples are naturally occurrent and edible while sparkplugs are inedible artifacts.
Consequently, while his epistemological views regarding sensory episodes parallel his treatment of the epistemology of occurrent thoughts, Sellars 'account of the ontology of sensations diverges dramatically from his functionalist account of thoughts.
Although the primary use of semantical terms remains the semantical characterization of overt verbal episodes, this Jonesean theory thus carries over the applicability of those semantical categories to its postulated inner episodes. i.e., to (occurrent) thoughts.
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